Introduction
The major outbreak of Ebola in West Africa in 2013-2016 was a tragedy which took the world by surprise. The disease was not new, but the extent of the outbreak and the massive impact it had on the lives, society and economies of the countries affected was unprecedented. Previously Ebola outbreaks had been relatively limited in scope and in a different social and epidemiological context. Scientific lessons learned from previous outbreaks were, therefore, essential to the early response, but insufficient. It is uncontentious to say that the initial response from the international community was too slow. Once a decision to act decisively was taken however, the impact of the courageous local and international responders depended on multiple lines of scientific evidence from many unrelated disciplines. Most of the data used during the epidemic were at the point it was incorporated into policy and practice unpublished, and therefore not formally peer reviewed, and much of it has still not been published. The aim of this commentary is to highlight the range of scientific evidence that was needed in the response which brought the epidemic under control concentrating in particular on aspects not covered by other papers in this series. Viewed from the safety of the year after the epidemic was controlled the end of the epidemic may look inevitable, but this was far from the case when the epidemic was in its initial phase of expansion. If any major part of the scientific underpinnings of the control effort had not been broadly correct and correctly acted on the endpoint could well have been very different.
Epidemiology and modelling
While the international community and multilateral bodies have accepted that the initial response to Ebola was too slow, the major response did start well in advance of the peak of the epidemic. What galvanized this action was the output of some relatively established modelling based on classical epidemiology of the likely future course of the epidemic [1] . These suggested that the force of transmission, R, was above 1 and probably initially just below 2 meaning an exponential rise which would within a few months accelerate out of control by any realistic intervention in the West African context [2] . The initial doubling time for the epidemic was around two weeks in some areas. The modelling was also essential for tracking the epidemic throughout its course by identifying the areas where R was increasing, even if the actual numbers were low, requiring enhanced efforts, and where it was decreasing indicating that control measures were beginning to have an effect [3] . Modelling alone was not the only epidemiological method used, and some of the decisions such as in Sierra Leone to place the majority of the intervention in periurban areas at a stage of the early epidemic when most of the impact was in the rural north had to be based on first principles about transmission dynamics before modelling had much to offer.
Based on previous much smaller epidemics two major routes of transmission were well known: from very sick people in hospitals to medical and nursing staff and other carers, and during funeral rites from people touching the bodies of those who died of Ebola. Immediate interventions were, therefore, undertaken to reduce the component of R from these two routes of transmission described below. In this epidemic, a third major component of transmission was, however, present on a much greater scale with a substantial proportion and in many areas probably the majority of transmission occurring in the community. The classical epidemiological approach to address this of finding and where necessary isolating contacts of cases, which was realistic at the beginning and end of the epidemic, was simply impractical with the very large numbers of new cases each week during the peak (October 2014-January 2015) given a weak public health service which had been further undermined by the deaths of some courageous public health leaders early in the epidemic. Initial epidemiological indications, subsequently confirmed, were that in the initial phases of the illness patients with Ebola were much less infectious than later in the disease. Modelling demonstrated that building and staffing Ebola treatment centre (ETC) beds alone could not keep pace with the expansion of the epidemic. An intervention to allow people with symptoms that might be compatible with Ebola and also with many other diseases such as malaria voluntarily to selfisolate in holding units or community care centres until their Ebola was either confirmed (in which case they were transferred to specialist ETCs) or ruled out by testing (in which case they were discharged) was established. At the time the decision was made the scientific balance of risks and benefits on disease transmission of these community centres had considerable uncertainties around them, and was controversial [4] .
In the last stages of the epidemic, when chasing down cases who had not presented was essential, the genetic sequencing of data to provide near real-time transmission trees was very useful. Understanding virus persistence in survivors, and in particular, sexual transmission following clinical recovery was also a new challenge in this epidemic, as this risked creating delayed transmission from survivors after control efforts had been scaled back [5] .
Reducing transmission and mortality: virology, infection control, engineering, diagnostics, clinical science
Central to the strategy to contain and then roll back the Ebola epidemic was caring for individuals with the disease in ETCs where they could be safely isolated at the point of their disease when they were most infectious. This also allowed the concentration of medical and nursing expertise for managing severe Ebola cases, which was in the interests of the patients and their families. There was, however, a substantial risk to nursing and medical staff, with initial (unpublished) planning estimates based on preliminary data that the infection rate among those caring for Ebola cases was around 10% per person year with over 70% mortality in medical staff who acquired it. There was, therefore, a difficult public health trade-off between expanding isolation treatment beds as fast as possible to catch up with and then get ahead of the epidemic curve, and doing it so quickly that staff were insufficiently trained and at significant risk of acquiring a fatal disease. There were initial concerns that the fact that the epidemic was expanding so rapidly might indicate a new route of transmission had evolved. It was, therefore, essential to reconfirm early in the epidemic that virtually all transmission was from touch or contact with bodily fluids, rather than airborne or vector borne. This would have needed a very different approach; isolating patients with airborne disease in a resource constrained system is very difficult. A rapid analysis of virology, epidemiological and genetic analysis provided sufficiently reassuring data on this point that initial planning did not need to take account of theoretical new routes of transmission. To optimize safety at minimal cost in time and resource also required experimental and observational data testing the survival of the virus on different surfaces, at different temperatures and when exposed to a variety of cleaning and disinfecting solutions. The design and build of ETCs had to be based around a realistic approach to staff, patients and family flow which would minimize contact between uninfected people and either infected people or infected material. In a tropical environment at the height of the rainy season when flooding was a constant risk this presented significant engineering challenges for a diarrhoeal disease when building against the clock. Two examples illustrate the range of sciences needed for even quite simple design questions. The size of holding tanks for sewage depended critically on the survival of the virus in sewage at local temperatures, but unnecessarily large holding tanks were a major constraint on the speed at which treatment centres could be built. It was also sometimes important to get geological and hydrological assessments to ensure that run-off from ETCs would be unlikely to reach drinking water supplies while the virus was still infectious.
Probably the biggest constraint on making the system of flow of patients who might have Ebola moving to ETCs was the very limited initial diagnostic capacity; had this been better matched to need the epidemic would probably have been significantly smaller [6] . This put huge strain on the whole system and led to people who had Ebola being held alongside uninfected people for prolonged periods.
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The PCR-based system based in a few specialist centres which is appropriate for a few cases was overwhelmed with the scale of testing needed, and the organization required to ship samples safely around the country to existing laboratory capacity was extraordinarily difficult making it a major bottleneck in the ability to respond to Ebola. Over the course of the epidemic a number of more rapid diagnostic testing systems, including from mouth swabs, were developed [7] . They were useful in the later part of the epidemic, especially in identifying people who died with Ebola which had not previously been identified, and are likely to have a significant role in any future Ebola epidemic making the response much more rapid and efficient.
Clinical science had a smaller role in the West African epidemic than it should have. In public-health terms, it was the isolation of cases which is essential for the overall epidemic. For individuals who had Ebola, however, reducing initial mortality was critical. There is reasonably convincing (currently unpublished) observational data suggesting that mortality rates decreased over the period in West Africa. This is likely to represent clinicians gradually improving the treatment as they grew more used to managing the disease. In particular, it probably represents better management of fluids. There was, however, a missed opportunity, particularly once the epidemic had peaked, to undertake proper structured clinical trials and studies which would have tested which components of care were most important for reducing mortality. Networks were set up to test advanced novel therapeutic interventions such as antibody treatments. This is a worthy aim, although it was unclear whether such interventions would ever be available on a wide scale in Africa. There was, however, much less thought given to testing widely available interventions in particular fluids and antibiotics and this mistake of not testing the easily testable should not be repeated in future epidemics of diseases with high mortality. In contrast with West Africa, clinical science including testing advanced therapies was probably the most important science in the response to the West African Ebola outbreak in Europe and the USA, in caring for repatriated healthcare workers [8] .
One intervention with public health and clinical science components which was both experimental and properly tested was community mass drug administration to reduce malaria incidence. The aim was both to reduce mortality from the very common potentially fatal disease malaria, and also to reduce the number of people presenting to have Ebola excluded who actually had malaria. It was based on sound science, and initial assessments suggest it was cost-effective [9] .
The central role of the social sciences
The social sciences, and in particular anthropology, played a critical role in addressing major routes of transmission of Ebola including funeral rites [10] . Funerals are central in all societies but in many Western societies handling of dead bodies is the preserve of professional undertakers. By contrast, in the countries affected by the West African Ebola epidemic funeral rites include complex handling and washing of the body by family, friends and the community. Since the bodies of those who died were highly infectious this led to substantial outbreaks. Handling and burying a body safely is relatively straightforward; doing so in a way which is acceptable to families and the community much more complicated. Advice given by social scientists during the epidemic built on decades of work observing funerary rites and ways these could be adapted to maintain the essence and symbolism without exposing those attending [11] . Social scientists also helped with the engagement with important groups such as the Sande female secret societies which are central to many rites of passage including funeral rites and also ones including traditional medicine and female genital cutting, which themselves risked Ebola transmission.
Much of the reduction in transmission in the community also involved changes to social organization, care seeking pathways and initiating greeting rituals which minimized touching. Fashioning a response and a communication strategy which ran with the grain of social beliefs and organization rather than against it again depended on insights from social scientists working in this area of West Africa [12] . They self-organized around an open anthropology platform which was invaluable to responders and policymakers and should be considered in any future outbreaks in any societies (http://www.ebola-anthropology.net/).
Vaccines: immunology and clinical trials
In contrast with several recent significant epidemics such as SARS, a number of potential Ebola vaccines had been developed, often to meet biodefence needs, prior to this Ebola outbreak. They had largely completed their immunological development pathway including testing in nonhuman primates with encouraging results. They had not, however, passed through any of the phases of human testing, and the scientific challenge was to take them through all human stages of safety and efficacy trials at speed, and various methods were used to do this [13] . Two approaches had shown promise in animal testing: a prime boost vaccine based on chimp adenovirus, and one based on vesicular stomatitis virus (VSV). Both were tested in phase 1 and phase 2 studies extremely rapidly in North America, Europe and West Africa. Initially, they were primarily thought of for mass vaccination prophylactically of the general population who might become exposed and healthcare workers. Protecting health workers is both an important humanitarian concern but also reduces transmission into the community, especially in areas new to the epidemic [14] . Because the VSV vaccine appeared to have rapid onset of antibody response there was also the possibility that if given to contacts of cases it might provide protection, a concept of ring vaccination deployed in the terminal stages of smallpox eradication. Novel trial designs for this ring vaccination strategy were very efficient in terms of numbers of patients recruited to detect a result and early indications were that the ring vaccination strategy was effective and it was, therefore, deployed in the final stages of controlling the epidemic [15] .
Integrating the sciences in a rapidly evolving epidemic
This commentary gives some indication of the range of sciences that were needed to ensure an optimal technical response to the West African Ebola epidemic. Having multiple sciences available, integrating them and applying them are three separate challenges. The international response to the epidemic in West Africa was undertaken against a very short timeframe rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 372: 20160293
with an escalating epidemic and the primary responders were a very small number of highly courageous and motivated local and international staff in a system without significant preexisting clinical science, epidemiological, laboratory or social science infrastructure. The final decisions rightly had to be taken by local authorities, but given the scale of the task multilateral organizations such as the WHO, international NGOs and external governments with access to scientific capacity inevitably had to provide much of the scientific underpinning to inform decisions taken by affected governments and in the field. The UK government took the lead bilateral role in supporting the government of Sierra Leone. UK responders in the field had access to scientists from several disciplines based in West Africa. Supporting this was the structure of the UK government scientific advisory group in emergencies (SAGE), with specific technical groups for social sciences and vaccine development. This allowed for rapid informal peer review of unpublished data, and integration of sciences from the many disciplines with independent experts contributing to the synthesis which had to happen in real time. These informed relevant responder government departments: for international development (DFID), the services (MOD) and the foreign service (FCO). They also fed into the political decision-making structure through the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms mechanism chaired by Ministers. Such mechanisms are never perfect, but without them it would have been difficult to bring to bear and integrate all the sciences needed, in particular, those which are sometimes seen as more peripheral to conventional public health responses such as social sciences and engineering. We need to learn not only from the things which went well in the scientific response, but also from those where it could have been improved, especially in early sharing of data which was initially disappointingly poor. Each major pandemic and epidemic brings new scientific challenges. The relative contributions of different sciences in responding to HIV, SARS, Zika and influenza are all different from those for Ebola. Common to all of them, however, is a need to marshal scientific expertise and rapidly develop new knowledge from many disciplines which do not always see themselves as part of public health. The West African Ebola epidemic was a tragedy for many individuals, families and communities. It would have been significantly worse, and might have spread more widely in Africa, if sciences from many disciplines, and in particular, the epidemiological, biological and social sciences had not informed the response.
